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BASING JUVENILE DETENTION ON PAST
ADJUDICATION: "FAIRNESS" AT THE
PREADJUDICATION STAGE OF THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM
In 1975 the Florida Legislature amended section 39.03(3)(c)(3) of
the Florida Statutes.' The amendment provides that a child taken into
custody for an alleged felony must be detained until his first ap-
pearance before a judge if he has twice previously been adjudicated
delinquent.2
Although this provision affects a relatively small number of ju-
veniles, it marks a major change in Florida's legislative attitude toward
juveniles. Florida's juvenile statutes are generally in conformity with
national standards for juvenile justice systems.3 Unfortunately, sec-
tion 39.03(3)(c)(3) is not in line with these standards, which advocate
1. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c) (1973), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c) (1975) provided:
(c) Unless ordered by the court pursuant to the provisions of this chapter,
a child taken into custody shall not be placed or retained in detention care or
shelter care prior to the court's disposition unless detention or shelter care is
required:
1. To protect the person or property of others or of the child.
2. Because he has no parent, guardian, responsible adult relative, or other
adult approved by the court able to provide supervision and care for him.
3. To secure his presence at the next hearing.
The criteria for placement in detention or shelter care given above shall govern
the decision of all persons responsible for determining whether detention or
shelter care is warranted prior to the court's disposition.
2. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c) (1975), amending FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c) (1973) provides:
(c) Unless ordered by the court pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, a
child taken into custody shall not be placed or retained in detention care or
shelter care prior to the court's disposition unless detention or shelter care is
required:
1. To protect the person or property of others or of the child.
2. Because he has no parent, guardian, responsible adult relative, or other
adult approved by the court able to provide supervision and care for him.
3. To secure his presence at the next hearing. If a child has been twice pre-
viously adjudicated a delinquent and has been charged with a third subsequent
delinquency which would constitute a felony if the child were an adult, said child
shall be detained under this subparagraph and shall have a detention hearing
within 24 hours of initial detention, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays, to determine the need for continued detention. The circuit court, or the
county court if previously designated by the chief judge of the circuit court, shall
hold the detention hearing. When the county judge is not an attorney, the chief
judge may designate members of the bar to hold the detention hearing.
The criteria for placement in detention or shelter care given above shall govern
the decision of all persons responsible for determining whether detention or
shelter care is warranted prior to the court's disposition.
(Emphasis added).
3. Compare FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1975) with UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr and 18
U.S.C. §§ 5031-42 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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pretrial release for the juvenile. 4 This provision denies a certain group
of juveniles the possibility of predetention hearing release. This denial
is predicated on the juvenile's past court record. Furthermore, the
court that holds the detention hearing and decides whether to authorize
detention prior to adjudication of the case on the merits is to consider
the provisions of section 39.03(3)(c) in making its decision.5 Thus, a
juvenile may be detained for at least 2 weeks, and in many cases for
as long as 6 weeks, because of his past record.6
The provision promises to have little or no beneficial effect upon
Florida's juvenile law system. It establishes an arbitrary and me-
chanical policy for pretrial detention that is contrary to the due process
standards of fairness which the general trend of law advocates for
juveniles.
Prior to its amendment in 1975, section 39.03(3)(c) provided for
three basic standards to govern the decisions of those responsible for
determining whether detention or shelter care was warranted prior
to the court's disposition. It provided that:
[A] child taken into custody shall not be placed or retained in de-
tention care or shelter care prior to the court's disposition unless
detention or shelter care is required:
1. To protect the person or property of others or of the child.
4. See UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § 14; 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (Supp. IV, 1974).
5. Note that FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.050 provides that the court is to make a finding that
"the release of the child would be inimical to the welfare of the child or of the
public .... ." Therefore, the amended section appears to conflict with the rules of
court, because it requires consideration of other than these two criteria.
It is well settled that "[r]ules of practice and procedure adopted by [the Supreme]
Court supercede any legislative enactment governing practice and procedure to the
extent that statute and rule may be inconsistent." Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490,
496 (Fla. 1974); E.g., In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure
(Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 2(a)), 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973); In re Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972); Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka,
149 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1963).
The courts of Florida realize that the juvenile statutes are in substantial conflict
with the juvenile court rules. The Florida Conference of Circuit Judges has sent the
following Resolution to the Florida Legislature: "Resolved, that the Conference
recommend that when the proposed new Rules of Juvenile Procedure are adopted by the
Supreme Court the Legislature revise Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, to remove therefrom
all items in conflict with such rules which are procedural rather than substantive in
nature." Fla. Conference of Circuit Judges, Recommendations to the Florida Legislature
(1975 annual convention, copy on file at FLA. ST. U.L. REV. offices).
6. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(7)(b) (1975) authorizes, on special order, a 30-day extension
of detention: "The court may extend the special order detaining a child an additional
30 days . . .when the grand jury fails to return an indictment within the 14-day period
for that purpose, or when the State Attorney shall give the court the notice provided
for in s. 39.02."
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2. Because he has no parent, guardian, responsible adult relative,
or other adult approved by the court able to provide supervision
and care for him.
3. To secure his presence at the next hearing.7
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes established the procedures to
be followed when a juvenile under suspicion of committing a crime
was taken into custody by a police officer.8 It provided that the above
criteria were to be considered at three separate stages. The arresting
officer made the initial decision concerning detention of the child.9
If the officer, after considering the section 39.03(3)(c) criteria, de-
termined that detention was not necessary, he released the child to
his parents or to a responsible adult relative.10 If, however, the officer
determined that detention was necessary, he notified the child's
parents of his decision and without unreasonable delay delivered the
child to an intake officer."
The intake officer reviewed the facts and determined whether de-
tention was required under the three criteria listed in section
39.03(3)(c).1 2 If he decided not to release the child, he authorized de-
tention care.' 3
The detained child was to receive a detention hearing within 24
hours, excluding Sundays and legal holidays, of his original deten-
tion. 4 At this hearing, a judge considered the section 39.03(3)(c)
criteria.15 If the judge deemed detention to be necessary, he entered
a special order directing detention,' 6 stating therein the reasons which
led to the belief that detention was necessary. 7
No juvenile was to be detained under a special order for more
than 14 days unless "an order of adjudication of the case" had been
entered by the court.' At the adjudicatory hearing, the court deter-
mined whether the juvenile committed the offense that initially led
to his arrest. After making this determination, the court entered
7. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c) (1973), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c) (1975).
8. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.03(1)-(3) (1975).
9. Id. § 39.03(3)(a).
10. Id. § 39.03(2).
11. Id. § 39.03(3)(a).
12. Id. § 39.03(3)(b).
13. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(b) (1975).




18. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(7)(b) (1975) provides in part as follows: "(b) No child shall
be held in detention or shelter care under a special order for more than 14 days unless
an order of adjudication for the case has been entered by the court."
1976)
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an order either dismissing the case, withholding adjudication, or
adjudicating the child delinquent.19
Finally, if the child was adjudicated delinquent, he received a dis-
positional hearing.20 The court received and considered a predisposi-
tion study prepared by an agent of the Division of Youth Services.
2 1
The court then determined the action to be taken with the child.
22
This procedure was criticized by those who feared that intake
officers were releasing hard-core juvenile delinquents immediately after
police took them into custody under suspicion of committing violent
crimes; it was believed that violent juveniles were being set free to
commit more crimes before their adjudicatory hearings. It was
argued that a juvenile received positive reinforcement of criminal
tendencies and lost respect for authority when not immediately
penalized for alleged crimes. In addition, critics of the system
feared the effects of police disillusionment upon seeing a recently
arrested juvenile set free before a complete arrest report could be filed.23
The Florida Legislature responded to these criticisms with Senate
Bill 165, which contained the 1975 amendment to section 39.03(3)(c)
(3) .24 The germ of this provision first appeared in the committee sub-
stitute for Senate Bill 371.25 Although this bill died on the Senate
calendar, its provision pertaining to juvenile detention was in-
corporated into Senate Bill 165.26 The passage of Senate Bill 165
19. Id. § 39.10.
20. Id. § 39.09(3).
21. Id.
22. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(28) (1975). FLA. STAT. § 39.11 (1975) spells out the court's power
with reference to a delinquent child. It may, for example, place the child on probation,
§ 39.11(2)(a); commit him to a licensed childcare institution, § 39.11(2)(b); or commit
him to the Division of Youth Services, § 39.11(2)(c).
23. For these and other criticisms of the release procedure consult Hearing Before the
Fla. Senate Select Subcomm. on Youth Services (April 10, 1975) (tapes on file with
the Fla. Senate Comm. on Health and Rehabilitative Services).
24. Fla. S. 165 (1975); Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-48.
25. Fla. S. 371 (1975). Senate Bill 371 was introduced in the Senate on April 15, 1975.
FLA. S. JouR. 90 (1975). It provided in part as follows: "4) Because the child has been
twice previously adjudicated a delinquent and has been charged with a third subsequent
delinquency which would constitute a felony if the child were an adult." This provision
eventually became FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c)(3) (1975). See notes 1, 2 supra. This bill was
promptly referred to the Judiciary-Criminal Committee. FLA. S. JOUR. 90 (1975). The
next day the bill was sub-referred to the Select Subcommittee on Legislation Relating to
Juveniles. FLA. S. JouR. 98 (1975). The Select Subcommittee presented its committee substi-
tute for Senate Bill 371. FLA. S. JoUR. 320 (1975).
26. At about the same time that Senate Bill 371 was making its difficult way through
the legislative process, Senate Bill 165 had begun an even more tortuous journey; on
April 8, 1975, the bill was introduced in the Senate, referred to the Senate HRS Com-
mittee, and placed on the calendar. FLA. S. JOUR. 16, 32 (1975). The committee substitute
was passed as amended and sent to the House. FLA. S. JouR. 39 (1975). The House,
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resulted in the amendment of section 39.03(3)(c)(3), which now
calls for the preadjudication detention of juveniles who have twice
previously been adjudicated delinquent. 27
Both national and Florida crime statistics indicate that there is
cause for concern about the effectiveness of the juvenile justice sys-
tem.2 8 These statistics, however, do not call for the strict measures of
section 39.03(3)(c)(3). On the contrary, there are indications that
much of the detention contemplated by the new provision will serve
no societal need. First, the decrease in the crime rate brought about
by extra detention will probably be negligible. The Division of Youth
Services (hereinafter referred to as DYS) stated in an annual report
that in 1974, of the 86,393 juveniles referred to it because of
delinquency problems, only 10,781 were detained at some stage of
the dispositional process.2 9 The DYS report also showed that of the
delinquent referrals released by DYS intake officers in 1974, only 6.7
percent fell into the "failure" category, i.e., either committed a
delinquent offense between release and disposition, ran away, or failed
to show for subsequent court appearance.30 Unfortunately, DYS does
not list separately the various offenses which bring a child within its
failure category;"' it is therefore impossible to know how many of the
"failures" actually committeed subsequent crimes. But it is reasonable
however, amended the bill. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 294-305 (1975). After further amendment,
the House passed the bill on April 25, 1975, and returned it to the Senate. FLA. H.R.
JouR. 318 (1975). The Senate declined to concur in the House amendments. FLA. S. JOUR.
180 (1975),. The House refused to recede. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 346 (1975). A conference com-
mittee was appointed. FLA. H.R. JouR. 346 (1975); FLA. S. Jotla. 187 (1975).
The conference committee inserted the present detention provision in Senate
Bill 165, drawing upon Senate Bill 371. The committee substitute for Senate Bill 165 was
passed in the Senate on May 26, 1975, FLA. S. JOUR. 380 (1975), and in the House on May
27, 1975, FLA. H.R. JOUR. 754 (1975).
27. See note 2 supra.
28. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55 (1967), where it is stated:
"Rough estimates . . . indicate that one in every nine youths-one in every six male
youths-will be referred to juvenile court in connection with a delinquent act (ex-
cluding traffic offenses) before his 18th birthday."
In 1973, 50.8% of all persons arrested for crimes against property were under the
age of 18. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 128 (1973).
Statistics gathered by the Florida Division of Youth Services after a 2-year study
showed a 48% recidivism rate for juveniles sentenced to training schools and a 41%
recidivism rate for juveniles sentenced to group treatment residential programs. Fla. Div.
of Youth Services, A Summary View of Juvenile Crime and Corrections in Florida, at 7
(Sept. 1975) (unpublished report, copy on file at FLA. ST. U.L. REV. offices).
29. [1974] FLA. Div. OF YOUTH SERVICES, ANNUAL COMPILATION OF QUARTERLY JNAS,
at 2.
30. ANNUAL COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 3.
31. Id.
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to assume that many of the 6.7 percent "failure" group released by
DYS either ran away or failed to appear rather than committed crimes
before their adjudicatory hearings.
Evidence suggests that removing crime-prone juveniles from society
for a short period of time is not an efficient method of lowering the
crime rate.3 2 Therefore, the likelihood that enforcement of section
39.03(3)(c)(3) will lower the juvenile crime rate is small. There is,
however, a possibility that the quality of justice for juveniles will be
lowered.
One deleterious aspect of section 39.03(3)(c)(3) is that it cannot be
consistently enforced at this time. There is no statewide information
system in Florida;33 the only way to determine whether a juvenile has
twice previously been adjudicated delinquent is to call the court where
the child was last adjudicated delinquent. Since most courthouses
are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., the difficulty which intake
officers will face is obvious. The intake officer's task is more difficult
when the apprehended juvenile lives in a different county from the
one in which his previous records are on file.3 4
Another shortcoming of section 39.03(3)(c)(3) is that it will increase
the workload of the already overworked juvenile justice system. To
compensate for this extra strain upon the judicial system, it provides
for the appointment of county judges and members of the bar to
hold detention hearings? 5 The decision rendered at the detention
hearing is an important one since the juvenile may be detained for
a period of 2 weeks, and, in some cases, this detention may be ex-
tended for an additional 30 days.so In light of the importance of the
32. Clarke, Getting 'Em Out of Circulation: Does Incarceration of Juvenile Offenders
Reduce Crime? 65 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 528 (1974).
33. Letter from Chief Justice Adkins of the Florida Supreme Court to circuit judges
who participate in juvenile court matters, June 26, 1975 (copy on file at FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. offices). On page 3 the Chief Justice stated: "Until Florida has a statewide com-
puterized information system, there will be no way to determine if a child has been twice
previously adjudicated a delinquent."
34. Interview with Ted Tollett, Fla. Div. of Youth Services, at Tallahassee, Fla.,
July 1, 1975.
35. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c)(3) (1975); section 39.02(1) provides that "[t]he circuit
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged
to be dependent or delinquent." FLA. STAT. § 39.03(c)(3)(c) (1975) provides that "[t]he
circuit court, or the county court if previously designated by the chief judge of the
circuit court, shall hold the detention hearing. When the county judge is not an attorney,
the chief judge may designate members of the bar to hold the detention hearing." (Em-
phasis added).
36. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(7)(b) (1975) provides:
No child shall be held in detention or shelter care under a special order for
more than 14 days unless an order of adjudication for the case has been entered
by the court. The court may extend the special order detaining a child an
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presumption of innocence and the right of pretrial release to our
system of justice,17 the appointment of judges who are inexperienced
in juvenile law to consider this important decision seems especially
unfair.
In summary, the enforcement of this provision may do more harm
than good. At present, it cannot be consistently enforced, and it per-
mits inexperienced persons to make decisions which may result in a
prolonged separation of a juvenile from family, home, friends, and
school work. Most importantly, it allows the detention of many
juveniles who do not need to be detainedA8
Since the beginnings of the separate juvenile court system in the
early nineteenth-century, juvenile proceedings in this country have
been classified primarily as civil rather than criminal; thus the
criminal rights of due process were not deemed applicable to juveniles. 9
English common law recognized the power of parens patriae-a residual
power in the crown to protect children. 40 That doctrine became the
state's basis for treating the juvenile suspect differently from his adult
counterpart. 41 Juvenile court systems envisaged a judge acting as a
mature and well balanced parent-a judge who would do whatever
was best for the child's care and rehabilitation while bypassing the pro-
cedure and formalities of the adult criminal system.4 2
By the middle of this century, however, it became clear that the
informality of the juvenile courts resulted in arbitrariness rather than
in justice.4' Dissatisfaction with the effects of arbitrary incarceration
of juveniles led to public concern about the entire juvenile justice sys-
additional 30 days in the case of a child covered by paragraph 39.02(5)(c) when
the grand jury fails to return an indictment within the 14-day period for that
pupose, or when the State Attorney shall give the court the notice provided for
in s. 39.02.
37. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
38. Excess detention of juveniles has long been considered undesirable. The Task
Force on Juvenile Delinquency found that "detention of children appears to be far too
routinely and frequently used . . . . The notorious inadequacy and overcrowding of
child detention centers and the not uncommon use of adult jails and lockups make the
practice even less tolerable." THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME
36 (1967) (hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT). The Task Force recommended that
"detention pending a detention hearing should be restricted to cases where it is clearly
necessary to protect the youth or the community." Id. at 37.
39. M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 5 (1974).
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-56 (1966).
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tern. 44 This concern led to action on the part of the United States
Supreme Court, which decided to impose due process standards upon
any proceeding which might result in incarceration of a juvenile.
In three decisions, Kent v. United States,45 In re Gault,41 and In re
Winship,47 the Supreme Court noted that the informality of the
juvenile system had failed to protect the best interests and welfare
of the child. In Kent, the Court stated that a waiver hearing must
"measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. ' '4 8
Gault and Winship, however, made it clear that specific criminal due
process rights would replace informality at any hearing which might
result in a loss of the juvenile's freedom.
Recognizing the failure of the juvenile justice system to live up to
the expectations of those who developed it, Justice Fortas pointed out
in Gault that "[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a boy
does not justify a kangaroo court."4'9 He then went on to establish
four criminal rights for juveniles facing adjudicatory hearings: (1) the
right to counsel;- (2) notice of charges; 51 (3) the privilege against self-
incrimination ;5 and (4) the rights to confrontation and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses. 53 Winship assured juveniles the same standard of
proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) used in criminal trials of adults. 54
Although the Supreme Court attempted to halt the practice of
unnecessary commitment of juveniles to institutions by imposing due
process guarantees at the adjudicatory level, it stopped short of
guaranteeing due process rights at preadjudicatory levels.5 5 Noting the
lamentable amount of pretrial detention imposed upon juveniles, some
44. This dissatisfaction with the effects of detention upon juveniles was voiced by
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 80 (1967):
Official action may actually help to fix and perpetuate delinquency in the child
through a process in which the individual begins to think of himself as delinquent
and organizes his behavior accordingly. That process itself is further reinforced by
the effect of the labelling upon the child's family, neighbors, teachers, and peers,
whose reactions communicate to the child in subtle ways a kind of expectation
of delinquent conduct. The undesirable consequences of official treatment are
maximized in programs that rely on institutionalizing the child.
45. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
46. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
47. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
48. 383 U.S. at 562.
49. 387 U.S. at 28.
50. Id. at 41.
51. Id. at 33-34.
52. Id. at 55.
53. Id. at 57.
54. 397 U.S. at 361--64.
55. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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lower courts moved to insure the above due process rights at pre-
adjudicatory detention hearings. As early as 1969, in Baldwin v. Lewis,56
a federal district court determined that due process rights were
necessary to prevent abuses at the detention level. Baldwin had been
detained on suspicion of committing arson, although examination of
the record showed that there were no facts which provided a basis
for his detention. The district court stated:
A detention hearing ... is, by its very nature, a proceeding which
may result in the deprivation of a juvenile's liberty for an in-
determinate period of time pending disposition of the accusations
against him. It is the opinion of this Court that a logical interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault . . . requires
that such a hearing satisfy all the requirements of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment.5 7
The Supreme Court of Alaska, in Doe v. State,5 came to a similar
conclusion. Doe, charged with selling LSD, was ordered detained
pending his adjudicatory hearing on the basis of a hearsay statement
that he had threatened one of the state's witnesses.5 9 The court found
reversible error in the trial court's refusal to guard Doe's due process
rights. Although the court mentioned that Gault had intended to en-
compass only adjudicatory hearings, it stated that "[i]nitially it should
be noted that due process standards must be observed at a detention
inquiry since it may result in the deprivation of the child's liberty. ' '6 0
One federal court has displayed its general dissatisfaction with pre-
detention protection of due process rights. In Conover v. Montemuro,6 1
the plaintiff contended that the intake interview (as it was conducted
by the probation department) violated his fourteenth amendment
rights. The district court found that "the threshold inquiry must focus
on the extent to which [In re Gault] . . .requires that juveniles be
accorded the same Fourteenth Amendment rights as adults."6 2 The
court found that Gault left unresolved the types of procedures which
would provide protection of constitutional rights at the preadjudicatory
stage.63
56. 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969), reversed for failure to exhaust state remedies,
442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971).
57. Id. at 1232.
5A. 487 P.2d 47 (Alas. 1971).
59. Id. at 49.
60. Id. at 53.
61. 304 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
62. Id. at 263.
63. Id.
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One of the most important preadjudicatory rights for adults is
the right to release on bail. Although pretrial release on bail is
generally considered to be a due process right, 4 the Supreme Court
has not found that this right should extend to juveniles. Gault, which
dealt only with constitutional rights at the adjudicatory level, left the
issue unresolved6 5 because bail relates to a preadjudicatory stage of
the judicial process. Even those courts which have found that juveniles
should have adult due process rights at the preadjudicatory level have
generally not found that pretrial release on bail is one of those rights.66
Most have found that a system of juvenile detention, if scrupulously
enforced, provides an adequate substitute for the due process right of
bail, without the hindrance of money bail.67 In Fulwood v. Stone,68
the plaintiff's attorney requested that the plaintiff be released on bail
pending his adjudicatory hearing. The trial court denied this request
without accepting any testimony regarding the appropriateness of re-
lease. The court of appeals refused to reach the question of whether
a "constitutional right to bail ' ' 69 existed in juvenile proceedings; it
stated that the Juvenile Court Act provided an adequate substitute for
bail.70 The court remanded for "appropriate inquiry"' 1 concerning pre-
trial custody and noted that "[i]f there were neither a right to bail
nor faithful adherence to the philosophy of the Juvenile Court Act,
the juvenile would receive the 'worst of all possible worlds.' "72
The Doe court, though upholding the right to due process at the
detention inquiry,73 noted that a juvenile faces special problems which
make "a blanket application of the right to pre-adjudication release"
64. See U.S. CONST. art. VIII. One author has stated that "[s]ince federal law has
always provided for a right to bail, the Supreme Court has never reached the consti-
tutional question of whether the Eighth Amendment implicitly grants the right to
bail." A. Hill, The Constitutional Controversy of a Juvenile's Right to Bail in Juvenile
Preadjudication Proceedings, 1 HASTINGS CONsTITrrIONAL L.Q. 215 (1974).
However, at least one lower court has decided that such an implication is warranted.
Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.C.C. 1960).
It is well settled in Florida that a denial of bail to one who is otherwise entitled
thereto is a deprivation of constitutional rights and due process of law. Ex parte
McDaniel, 97 So. 317 (Fla. 1923); Nix v. McCallister, 202 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1967).
65. 387 U.S. at'13.
66. See A. Hill, supra note 64, at 233.
67. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 68, 73 infra.
68. 394 F.2d 939 (D.C.C. 1967).
69. Id. at 943.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 944.
72. Id. at 943, n.14, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) ("worst
of both worlds" in original).
73. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alas. 1971).
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* undesirable.7 4 The right to bail could, for instance, result in sending
the child back into the hands of parents who are abusive or who are
unwilling to accept the responsibility of their child's delinquency.75
The court further stated that, since a child would be dependent upon
parental financial assistance to obtain release, a child's right to
bail would not necessarily result in release. 76 It stated that the juvenile
court rules dealing with pretrial release could be "construed and
applied" to provide juveniles with an adequate substitute for bail 7
But in one recent New York Supreme Court case, the court found
that even strict adherence to juvenile detention standards was in-
sufficient to substitute for the due process right of bail when the
standards imposed upon juveniles for detention differed from those
imposed upon adults. In People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf,78 the court
found unconstitutional a section of the New York Family Court Act
which provided that a juvenile defendant could be detained if there
was a substantial risk that he would commit a crime before his hearing.
The court pointed out that
[i]t is irrational to conclude that persons under the age of sixteen-
who are found to have a propensity to commit crime-need to be
kept from society while persons over sixteen who are found to have
an equal (or greater) propensity to commit crime may not, by virtue
of that fact alone, be confined. Preventive detention is irrational
when applied if it is imposed because of age and not the danger to
society.79
Not only did the Wayburn court recognize the due process right
of pretrial release for juveniles, but it also insisted that the factors
taken into consideration in effecting that release be the same as those
considered in the pretrial release of adults. The Wayburn court, how-
ever, tried to preserve the benefits of the juvenile system: it did not
insist that a juvenile post bail in order to secure release. 0
Clearly these cases demonstrate a trend in current juvenile court
decisions; they seek to guarantee fair treatment of the juvenile by im-




78. 365 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
79. Id. at 113-14.
80. The court in People ex rel Wayburn v. Schupf, 365 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct.
1975) held that the New York Family Court Act did not confer upon a judge the power
to fix bail for juvenile respondents (this case deals with a different juvenile from the
one involved in People ex rel Wayburn v. Schupf, 365 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1974)).
1976]
376 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.4:365
plementing his due process rights whenever necessary to correct unfair
juvenile justice practices. Although some lower courts have found that
fairness should be measured by adult due process standards at pre-
adjudicatory levels,8' the Supreme Court has not done so.8 2 Among
those courts which have recognized a due process right of pretrial
release for the juvenile, most have recommended a substitute system
for release on bail.8 3 Those courts have found that this substitute must
be in accord with due process notions of fairness.
8 4
Exactly which standards of pretrial release are fair is unclear. The
Uniform Juvenile Court Act enumerates three model criteria for es-
tablishing a fair pretrial release system;85 these criteria were formerly
embodied in section 39.03(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes.8 6 The juvenile
delinquency chapter of the United States Code87 contains similar
standards; it provides that the juvenile shall be released unless "the
detention of such juvenile is required to secure his timely appearance
before the appropriate court or to insure his safety or that of others.
' ' 8
The addition of a criterion which calls for the detention of
juveniles based on their past records constitutes a mechanical standard
for preadjudicatory detention. Courts have long abhorred arbitrary or
mechanical standards for pretrial release no matter what their statutory
basis. In In re M,89 a California trial court had stated that any ju-
venile who sold marijuana was to be detained for the safety of others.
But the California Supreme Court found "that the juvenile court
cannot establish mechanical 'policies' for automatic detention";90 it
stated that "each juvenile [should] be treated as an individual."'- In
81. See, e.g., Moss v. Weaver, 383 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Fla. 1974), modified, 525 F.2d 1258
(5th Cir. 1976); Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd for failure
to exhaust local remedies, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971).; Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alas.
1971); People ex rel Wayburn v. Schupf, 365 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
82. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
83. E.g., Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C.C. 1967); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47
(Alas. 1971). However, according to LEVIN & SARRI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF LEGAL CODnS IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (1974), 20 states permit juveniles to
post bail: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia.
84. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alas. 1971).
85. See UNIFORM JUVENILE CoUtRT AcT § 14.
86. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c) (1973), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(c) (1975).
87. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42 (Supp. IV, 1975).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (Supp. IV, 1975).
89. 473 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1970).
90. Id. at 747-48.
91. Id. at 748.
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Baldwin v. Lewis, 92 the children's court found at the detention hearing
that it would be in the best interests of the juvenile and the community
for the boy to be detained.9 3 The sole basis for this finding appeared to
be the seriousness of the crime charged.94 The district court found
that the child was denied due process of law. 95
In In re G.M.B.,90 the Supreme Court of Alaska found that a mere
recitation of the juvenile's previous history was not sufficient to show
detention was "necessary" for the protection of the juvenile or
others. And in People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf,9 ' the court found
that the criteria for depriving a juvenile of his liberty before trial
should be identical to those for determining whether an adult should
be free before trial. The court ruled that pretrial detention was
authorized only when there was a substantial probability that the de-
fendant would not appear for his adjudicatory hearing."8
Although the trend toward granting due process rights at pread-
judicatory stages of the dispositional process has not been followed
in Florida's state courts, it has been demonstrated in at least
one federal court in Florida. In Moss v. Weaver,9 9 the plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the practice of imposing pre-
trial detention upon accused delinquents without a probable cause
hearing. The district court stated that "the classical principles of
procedural due process of law mandate that the state may not impose a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without an appropriate due
process hearing."'10 The court, however, limited its ruling to a declara-
tory judgment granting a probable cause hearing to juveniles who
were denied relief under existing procedures. 10 1
Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(a) states that it acts in
lieu of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.130, which is Florida's
adult bail rule. 0 2 It is clear that Florida's pretrial release system for
juveniles is meant to substitute for the adult's constitutional right of
92. 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969), reversed for failure to exhaust local remedies,
442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971).
93. Id. at 1225.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1233.
96. 483 P.2d 1006 (Alas. 1971).
97. 365 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
98. Id. at 114.
99. 383 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
100. Id. at 134.
101. Id. at 135. Granting probable cause hearings to such juveniles appears now
to be standard practice in Florida.
102. FLA. R. CRuM. P. 3.130; FL4. STAT. §§ 903.02-.36 (1975) contain Florida's statu-
tory provision for release on bail.
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pretrial release on bail.10 3 Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.050
states that, if a court decides to detain a juvenile, it must make a
specific finding that the juvenile's release would be inimical to him-
self or to society.10 4 Thus the rule which sets judicial standards of
fairness for the pretrial release of juveniles is in substantial accordance
with the prior version of section 39.03(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes.
Both the rule and the previous statute imply that fairness demands
that a child remain free before his adjudicatory hearing, unless
his freedom is not in the best interests of himself or society.
It is clear that as amended, section 39.03(3) (c) establishes a standard
for pretrial release which is not in line with the notions of fairness
established by the Supreme Court's decision in Gault and the cases
following it. It establishes precisely the kind of mechanical policy for
detention struck down by the California Supreme Court in In re M.
Further, it establishes a standard for pretrial release which neither the
United States Code nor the Uniform Juvenile Court Act incorporates.
The provision is unrelated to the standards established by the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure or to prior Florida statutory law, which
are both substantially the same as national codifications. Not only is
the new provision unrelated to the effectuation of the goals of these
systems, but it is also a direct contradiction of their clear purpose: to
make juvenile detention the exception rather than the rule.
PATRICIA R. DOUGLAS
103. Adults in Florida have a right to pretrial release on bail. See FLA. CONsT. art. I,
§ 14; Gray v. State, 54 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1951) (the Florida Supreme Court discussed
the right to bail where the charge is a capital offense). See also A.N.E. v. State, 156 So.
2d 525, 527 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (for the proposition that pretrial bail is not
appropriate for juveniles in Florida).
104. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.050.
